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Abstract : Taylor rules which link short-term interest rates to fluctuations in inflation and output, have 
been shown to be a good guide (both positively and normatively) to the conduct of monetary policy. As 
a result they have been used extensively to model policy in the context of both closed and open 
economy models. A key question that arises when analysing the conduct of such policy rules in the 
open economy case is whether the relevant measure of inflation is the growth in output prices or 
consumer prices. In this paper, we show that embedding a rule specified in terms of output price 
inflation into a benchmark two-country model confirms the existing result that local stability requires 
that the response of nominal interest rates to excess inflation should be such that real interest rates rise 
(the Taylor Principle), but this requirement may be partially offset by raising the interest rate response 
to increases in the output gap. However, all the conventional results do not hold when we replace 
output price inflation with consumer price inflation. In this case, Taylor rules which satisfy the Taylor 
principle  will  not  support a unique rational expectations path for prices and other macroeconomic 
variables in response to specific shocks. Our results suggest that adoption of consumer price based 
Taylor rules might be chronically destabilising
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1. Introduction
Monetary policy rules based on inflation targets are widely used in the literature, in 
the context of both closed and open economy models. The best known example is the Taylor 
rule (see Taylor (1993)), which takes the following form, 
( ) ( )
T
t t p t y t t R r m m y y π π π = + + − + − (1)
where Rt represents the short-term nominal interest rate. The rule requires the central bank to 
raise this interest rate in response to excess inflation,
T
t π π −  and the output gap,  t t y y − .
Taylor (op. cit.) argued that for such a rule to approximate optimal monetary policy it should 
satisfy what has become known as the  Taylor Principle, which states that the  response of 
nominal interest rates to excess inflation should be more than one for one, such that real rates 
rise whenever inflation lies above its target, cet. par. That the rule should satisfy the Taylor 
Principle has been confirmed more formally in the  context of simple General Equilibrium 
models which include nominal price rigidities (see for example, Clarida  et al (1999) and 
Woodford (2001)). 
In extending this analysis to the open economy, a key issue is whether consumer price 
inflation might be a better target than output price inflation. There are several reasons why 
adopting  a  rule  based  on  consumer  price  inflation  may  behave  differently  from  a  rule
formulated in terms of a measure of output prices, such as the GDP deflator. For example, the 
impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate may be passed through into consumer prices 
faster than monetary policy affects domestic prices through other channels of the transmission 
mechanism, especially as the exchange rate can be thought of an asset price which reflects not 
only current monetary policy, but also anticipated future policy. Additionally, the impact of 
foreign shocks may take longer to be revealed in domestic output and inflation data, relative 
to the affect they have on consumer price inflation through the exchange rate. (See Svensson 
(2000) for a discussion of this and related issues.) In practice all central banks implementing 
inflation targeting have chosen a consumer price-based measure of inflation. 
Empirical work which seeks to estimate Taylor rules as a means of describing and 
evaluating past policy has not reached a conclusion on this issue. For example, the original 
Taylor rule (Taylor,  op. cit.) is specified in terms of output prices in the form of the GDP 
deflator. This measure is also adopted in the empirical work of, for example, Fair (2000), 
McCallum (2000) and Orphanides (2001). However, it is as least as common for the rule to be 
specified  in  terms  of  CPI  inflation – see for example, Clarida  et  al (1998), Gerlach and 
Schnabel  (2000)  and  Altavilla  (2000).  A  rare  example  of  where  the  two  measures  are
compared is, Clarida  et al  (2000), who show that replacing an output-price definition of 3
excess inflation with CPI inflation does not significantly alter the estimated coefficients of a
Taylor-type rule describing US monetary policy. 
At the same time a related theoretical literature has attempted to characterise optimal 
monetary policy in the context of small country open economy models
1. In deriving optimal 
monetary policy rules for a benchmark small open economy model, Clarida et al (2001) argue 
that the policy maker’s problem is isomorphic to that in the closed economy case, and that 
optimal monetary policy should, therefore, follow a simple Taylor rule, with excess inflation 
defined in terms of output price inflation. Essentially this paper argues that monetary policy 
should seek to minimise the distortions caused by nominal inertia (the only uncompensated 
distortion in the model) in an attempt to recreate the equilibrium that would emerge under 
flexible prices. Since the nominal inertia is assumed to only apply to output prices then this 
should be the appropriate target for monetary policy. Subsequent work has suggested that 
relaxing some of the assumptions underpinning this benchmark model, say, for example, by 
allowing  for  stickiness  or  incomplete  exchange-rate  pass-through in the setting of import 
prices, may result in open economy variables, such as the exchange rate, entering into the 
optimal monetary rule (see, for example, Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Monacelli (1999) and 
Kara and Nelson (2002)). However, even in the benchmark model, where monetary policy 
need only compensate for domestic price stickiness, there is no suggestion that adopting an 
alternative definition for target inflation would fundamentally destabilise the economy.
In this paper we argue that, in the context of a two country model where PPP holds 
for consumer prices but not output prices (as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for example), if 
both countries implement Taylor rules which satisfy the Taylor Principle, defining excess 
inflation in terms of consumer prices will result in indeterminacy, such that there will not be a 
unique  rational  expectations  path  for  prices.  This  indeterminacy  does  not  arise  if  each
economy targets output price inflation. This implies that adoption of Taylor rules based on 
consumer price inflation may not just be sub-optimal, but may be chronically destabilising. 
In section 2 we develop a version of the Obstfeld-Rogoff model (op cit), which is 
widely used in the literature.  We augment that model in three ways. First, we relax the 
assumption that consumers are infinitely lived, by introducing a fixed probability of death. 
This prevents monetary policy shocks having permanent real effects. Second, we introduce a 
rudimentary  government  sector,  so  that  consumers  in  both  countries  can  hold  positive
quantities  of  government  debt,  but  where  fiscal  policy  does  not  induce  any  changes  in
aggregate demand following a shock. Third, we introduce nominal inertia via Calvo (1983) 
contracts, which motivates the need for a monetary policy rule. In section 3 we demonstrate 
1 Benigno and Benigno (2001) and Clarida et al (2002) consider the desirability of co-ordinating
monetary policies in the context of a two country model. However, the fundamental stabilising 4
the key results of the paper, using the benchmark model developed in section 2. Section 4 
concludes.
2. A Two-Country Model under flexible exchange rates.
In this section we augment the two country model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) -
henceforth O-R - so that we can use it to analyse the stability of alternative monetary policy 
rules.
The Consumer’s Problem
Consider the utility of a typical home consumer, i, who consumes from a basket of 
consumption goods, derives utility from real money balances and provides labour services, 
2 [ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ]exp( ( )
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where β is the individual’s discount rate (discussed below) and the basket of consumption 
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Since there are assumed to be no impediments to trade, the law of one price holds for each 
individual good, so that the Home price index can be re-written as,
1 1
1 * 1 1
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where p(z) is the home currency price of good z, p*(z) is the foreign currency price of good z 
and ε is the nominal exchange rate (where a rise represents a depreciation for home).
In O-R  consumers  are  infinitely  lived.  As  the  authors  show,  this  means  that
temporary, asymmetric changes in monetary policy lead to permanent changes in the real 
economy, because the distribution of wealth between the two economies changes. As we wish 
to  analyse  the  ability  of  interest  rate  rules  specified  in  terms  of  alternative  definitions  of 
excess inflation to stabilise the economy in the face of various shocks it is helpful to avoid 
this result, by introducing the possibility that consumers have finite lives. This then ensures 
properties of interest rate rules under alternative definitions of excess inflation are not considered in 
these papers. 5
that  there  is  a  unique  steady-state  which  any  viable  interest  rate  rule  must  return  our
economies  to  following  a  temporary  shock.  The  uniqueness  of  this  steady-state will then 
allow us to compare the stabilising properties of alternative interest rate rules in a consistent 
manner. Specifically, we follow Blanchard (1985) and assume that consumers face a constant 
instantaneous probability of death,  k, so that consumers discount future u tility at the rate, 
k σ + , where σ  is the rate of time preference in the absence of the probability of death and 
the effective interest rate  faced by  consumers in  borrowing/lending  and  discounting  their 
future labour income is given by,  t r k + .
The consumer can hold her financial wealth in the form of domestic government 
bonds, foreign bonds, and money balances. Since PPP holds at all points in time, the ex ante
real  rates  of  return  on  domestic  and  foreign  bonds  will  be  the  same,  such  that 
*
t t r r = .
Additionally, we assume that all debt is fully indexed such that surprise inflation will not 
affect the real rate of return on the consumer’s interest bearing financial wealth, cet. par.
Domestic consumers receive a share in the profits of domestic firms,  t Π . It is assumed that 
the consumer receives a premium from perfectly competitive insurance companies in return 
for their financial assets should they die. This effectively raises the rate of return from holding 
financial assets by k. Consumers earn a real wage, wt and pay real lump sum taxation of  t τ .
Therefore, the consumer’s budget constraint, in real terms, is given by,
*
* ( )( ) ( )
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t A  represents consumer i’s financial assets, which can either be held as domestic 
bonds, as money, 
i
t M  or in the form of foreign bonds, 
*i
t F .
The consumer than has to maximise utility (2), subject to their budget constraint (6)
along with the standard solvency conditions. The various first order conditions this implies 
are given below. Firstly, there is the usual consumption Euler equation,
( )
i i
t t t dc r c σ = − (7)
















Integrating  the  consumer’s  Euler  equation  forwards  and  substituting  into  the
intertemporal  budget  constraint  yields  the  fully  solved  out  version  of  the  consumption
function,
( )( ( )exp( ( ( ) ) )
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If we normalise total population size to one, then it is possible to aggregate across 
generations by noting that the current size of a generation of size k when born at time z is 
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Applying  this  aggregation  to  all  variables  allows  us  to  derive  the  aggregate  domestic
consumption function as,
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where the aggregate financial wealth of domestic consumers is made up of their holdings of 
money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds, 
*
t t t t A M D F = + + .
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In  the  foreign  country  there  will  be  corresponding  equations  for  labour supply,  money
demand and consumption.
The Firm’s Problem
Firms are assumed to maximise the discounted value of their profits. In the absence of 
capital and without any constraints on price setting the firm would simply maximise profits in 
each period in a static manner. However, it is assumed that firms are subject to the constraints 
implied by Calvo (1983) contracts such that at each point in time firms are able to change 
prices with a probability  α . As firms cannot adjust their prices continuously, there is an 
2 In general the non-linear formulation of the labour supply decision means that a simple aggregation in 
terms of per capita aggregates is not possible. However, upon log-linearisation this equation can be 
represented in terms of percentage deviations from steady-state of aggregate variables.7
intertemporal dimension to the firm’s pricing/output decision. Suppose the firm is able to 
change its current price, then its objective function for determining its optimal value is given 
by,
( )
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For simplicity it is assumed that the firms production technology is linear,  ( ) ( ) t t y z N z = . The 















Integrating demands across consumers and assuming that the home government allocates its 
spending in the same pattern as home consumers implies that world demand for product z is 
given by,
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(17)
where  y(z),  c,  c*,  g,  and  g*  are  defined  as  real  per  capita  variables.  Given  the  linear
production function, the firm’s (per capita) demand for labour will be equivalent to equation 
(17).
Utilising the home and foreign demands for product z, allows us to rewrite the firm’s 
objective function as,
* * ( ) ( )
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where the discount rate is raised by the instantaneous probability  α to reflect the fact that this 
price may be in force for some time. 
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The home output price index,  ( )t p h  is a weighted average of the prices set in the 
past, where the weights reflect the probability that these prices are still in existence,
1
1
1 ( ) [ exp( ( )) ]
t






= − − ∫ ɶ (20)8
where t p ɶ  is the price set in accordance with equation (19) by those home producers that were 
able to change prices at that point in time. The aggregate consumer price level is, in turn, 
given by,
1
1 1 1 [ ( ) (1 )( ( ) ) ] t t t t P np h n p f
θ θ θ ε
− − − = + − (21)
Home output is given by, 
* * ( )
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(22)
which, given the linear production technology, means that demand for labour is obtained by 
summing across the n home firms,
* * ( )
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The home government’s budget constraint, in real terms, is given by,
( ) t t t t t t t t dl r l m m g π τ = − − + − (24)
where the total liabilities of the government, lt are made of government bonds held by home 
consumers (dt) or by foreign consumers (
*
t f ), and non-interest bearing money, mt. Aside from 
borrowing and seigniorage, the government finances spending by levying a lump-sum tax of 
t τ  on home consumers. 
The introduction of a probability of death, which was necessary to generate a unique 
steady-state, implies that government debt is an element of net wealth and that Ricardian 
Equivalence does not hold. As a result there may be interactions between monetary and fiscal 
policy when stabilising the economy following a shock.
3 However, since the focus of this 
paper is on the specification of the monetary policy rule, we wish to formulate fiscal policy in 
such a way that it does not directly affect the macroeconomic outcomes in  our economies. 
The simplest way of achieving this is by assuming that government spending is constant and 
that  lump-sum  taxation  is  adjusted  to  ensure  that  the  real  value  of  government  liabilities 
remain at their steady-state level, such that,
t t t t g rl R m τ = + − (25)
This means that there is no delay in adjusting taxation to ensure that government debt remains 
at its steady-state level and that fiscal policy does not affect aggregate demand even although 
consumers face a probability of death. Additionally, the fact that government debt is indexed 9
and fiscal policy is clearly solvent, means that we can ignore the complications that the Fiscal
Theory of the Price Level creates for the conduct of monetary policy (for a summary see 
Woodford (2001)). Similar policies are followed in the foreign economy.
Appendix I details the log-linearisation of the model around its steady-state. We now 
consider the implications of adopting different definitions of excess inflation in monetary 
policy rules of the Taylor form. 
3.Defining Excess Inflation in the Taylor Rule
Monetary Policy Targeting Output Price Inflation
In  this  subsection  we  assume  that  monetary policy follows a Taylor rule which 
specifies  excess  inflation  in  terms  of  output  prices.    Monetary  policy  in  both  economies 
involves setting nominal interest rates to target domestic output price inflation such that,
ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) t op t y t rR m h m y π = + + (26)
and,
* * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) t op t y y rR m f m y π = + + (27)
where  a  hatted  variable  denotes  percentage  deviation  from  steady-state  as  defined  in
Appendix I.
We then embed these rules into our log-linearised two country model, which allows 
us to write the model in matrix form as, 
ˆ ˆ t d = t x Ax (28)
where
' * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ [ ( ) , ( ) , , , , ] t t t t t t t h h e c c a π π = x is a vector of six endogenous variables
4, and  A is the 
transition matrix detailed in Appendix II, whose elements are combinations of the underlying 
structural parameters of the model, and which describes the dynamic evolution of our two 
economies.
Necessary Conditions for Saddle-Path Stability
The question we now pose is which values of the monetary policy parameters  op m
and
*
op m   ensure  that  the  model  will  deliver  saddlepath  stability?  In  other  words  can  we
identify  the  conditions  under  which  policy  will  generate  a  unique  path  for  prices  under 
3 For an analysis of such interactions in the context of a similar open economy model see Leith and 
Wren-Lewis (2002), which extends the closed economy analysis of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).10
rational  expectations  and  ensure  that  both  countries  return  to  their  steady-state  values
following a temporary shock? 
With  a  flexible  exchange  rate  and  forward-looking  price-setting and consumption 
behaviour,  the  only  predetermined  variable  in  the  system  is  financial wealth,  ˆt a .  The
remaining five variables are ‘jump’ variables. Saddlepath stability requires there to be as 
many  eigenvalues  with  positive  real  parts  as  there  are  ‘jump’  variables.  The  necessary
condition for saddlepath stability is, therefore, that the determinant is negative. In the general
case the determinant of the transition matrix is quite complex. However, it can be simplified 
by assuming that 
*
y y m m = . Under this simplifying assumption the determinant becomes, 
* * [1]( ) ( [2] [3] )( ) [4] ( (1 )) op op y op op y y
g
A m m A A m m m A m r m
y
σ − − + + − − + − (29)
where [ ] 0 A i > , i=1,..4 are expressions combining the structural parameters of the model, but 
which are not a function of the parameters of the policy rules. These expressions are defined 
in Appendix III, where they are also shown to be positive. This expression reveals that 
positive coefficients on excess inflation and the output gap in the monetary policy rules of the 
two economies will ensure a negative determinant consistent with saddlepath stability. The 
expression  also  shows  that  there  are  potential  interactions  between  policy  parameters  in
achieving saddlepath stability. To see this we solve the determinant condition for the two 
policy coefficients on excess inflation to give, 
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where i and j refer to the respective monetary authorities
5.
The conditions in equations (30) and (31) can be represented diagrammatically as the 
area to the right of the parabola in Figure 1, which has been drawn under the assumption that 
0 y m = .
4 The model can be reduced to a dynamic system in six variables by using the market clearing 
conditions in the goods and bonds markets as shown in Appendix II. 
5 There are corresponding conditions with the signs reversed (i.e when  op m strongly violates the Taylor 
principle), but numerical evaluation of the eigenvalues (see footnote 6 below) suggests that although 
this satisfies the determinant condition it does not deliver saddlepath stability.11
Figure 1 – Restrictions on Interest Rate Rule Parameters Required for Stability.
When y m  is zero, such that monetary policy does not respond to the output gap, then the 
parabola passes through the origin i.e. if both authorities satisfy the Taylor principle then the 
economies  will  be  saddlepath  stable.  From  the  determinant  condition  it  is  also  clear  that
adding  a  positive  monetary  policy  response  to  the  output  gap  can  reduce  the  need  for
monetary policy to satisfy the Taylor principle. Effectively, increasing  y m  shifts the parabola 







. This confirms in a two country set-up a result from the literature (see 
for example Woodford (2001)) which suggests that the coefficient on excess inflation must be 
positive in order for the Taylor rule to be stabilising, but that raising the coefficient on the 
output gap can partially reduce the need to fulfil the Taylor principle.
A result that is new is that there are spillovers from policy in one economy to the 
other  (due  to  non-Ricardian  consumers  and  nominal  inertia),  which  allow  one  monetary
authority to compensate for a lax monetary policy on the part of the other. This emerges since 
domestic consumption depends upon the real interest rate defined as the nominal rate relative 
to  consumer  price  inflation.  Therefore,  an  aggressive  monetary  policy  abroad  can,  by
reducing the rate of inflation in the imported component of consumption, raise real interest 
rates in the home economy and compensate for a weak domestic monetary policy response. 
However,  the  extent  to  which  compensation  is  possible  is  limited –  a  monetary  policy
[2] [3]
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op m m <  cannot be compensated for by increasing the responsiveness of monetary 
policy in the second economy.
Overall, our analysis of Taylor rules using excess inflation defined in terms of output 
prices, in the context of a benchmark two country model with nominal inertia, confirms and 
extends results already detailed in the literature. Satisfying the Taylor principle allows the 
rules to generate a unique equilibrium path for prices. Allowing monetary policy to respond to 
deviations of output from equilibrium  can, partially, mitigate the need to satisfy the Taylor 
principle.  We  also  find  that  policy  spillovers  imply  that  one  monetary  authority  can
compensate to a limited degree for a relatively weak monetary response to inflation in another 
economy.
Monetary Policy in Both Economies Targeting Consumer Price Inflation
We now assume that the monetary policy of the both economies involves setting nominal 
interest rates to target consumer price inflation so that,
ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t cp t y t rR m m y π = + + (32)
and,
* * * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t cp t y t rR m m y π = + + (33)
Appendix  IV  details  the  dynamic  system  under  this  monetary  policy  specification.  The 
determinant of the transition matrix when the interest rate rule is defined in terms of consumer 
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(34)
Now suppose that we consider the set of parameter values such that  op cp p m m m = =
and
* * *
op cp p m m m = = , in other words we condition on the strength of the monetary policy rule, 
so that the only difference is the price measure targeted. It is then straightforward to show that 
the ratio of the determinants of the two transition matrices when excess inflation is defined in 
terms of consumer and output prices, respectively is given by,
*
2




In  other  words,  a  combination  of  positive  feedback  parameters  which  ensures
saddlepath stability in the case of output price inflation, will unambiguously fail to do so 
when excess inflation is defined in terms of consumer prices, since the sign of the determinant 
of the transition matrix of the underlying dynamic system changes. It is therefore the case that 
the  results  shown  above  for  output  price  inflation  are  reversed  by  simply  changing  the 13
definition  of  excess  inflation  from  output  price  inflation  to  consumer  price  inflation.  In 
particular, Taylor rules using consumer prices that satisfy the Taylor principle will no longer 
stabilise the two economies
6. Furthermore, it is not possible for the monetary authorities to 
alter the coefficient on the output gap to compensate for the instability induced by targeting 
consumer price inflation in the Taylor rule. 
Monetary Policy in One Economy Targeting Consumer Price Inflation
The  final  case  we  consider  is  where  the  home  economy  targets  consumer  price 
inflation,
ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t cp t y t rR m m y π = + + (36)
while the foreign economy targets output price inflation
7,
* * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) t op t y y rR m f m y π = + + (37)
Details of the dynamic system under this combination of policy rules is given in Appendix V. 
However, the key result is that the ratio of the determinants when both countries target output 
price inflation, relative to the case where one economy adopts a CPI inflation target is given 
by,
2
1 p m −
(38)
Therefore, if a country is aggressively targeting CPI inflation, such that the coefficient on 
excess inflation in a Taylor rule is greater than one, then this will also lead to indeterminacy. 
To understand the intuition behind these results, it is helpful to remove the output gap 
term and  concentrate  solely  on  the  consequences  of  changing  the  definition  of  excess
inflation.
Rules reacting to Inflation Alone
In order to highlight the differences between output price and CPI inflation targeting 
in the context of Taylor rules, we shall consider the uniqueness or otherwise of the dynamic 
path towards the unique steady-state. We shall initially describe a dynamic path that returns 
6 Of course the analysis of the determinant only gives us necessary conditions for saddlepath stability. 
However, numerical analysis of the eigenvalues of the dynamic system using a plausible parameter set 
described in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2002) confirms that monetary policy rules based on output price 
inflation which satisfy the Taylor principle will be saddlepath stable. However, when we turn to the 
case of consumer price inflation, any combination of positive inflation feedback parameters implies 
that there are too many stable roots – we are faced with the problem of indeterminacy. 
7 Since the two economies are otherwise symmetrical, consideration of this final case implies that we 
have covered all possible permutations of definitions of excess inflation across our two 
rules/economies.14
our economies to equilibrium following an asymmetric shock. We shall then consider whether 
or not deviations from the initial jumps in variables assumed as part of this dynamic path 
imply that we fail to reach the equilibrium. In the case of output price inflation targeting, we 
shall see that deviating from our equilibrium path implies that our economies evolve al ong an 
explosive trajectory, while in the case of CPI inflation targeting a return to equilibrium will 
still be achieved. In other words, there is a unique saddle-path equilibrium under output price 
inflation targeting, but indeterminacy under CPI inflation rules. 
Intuition is clearer if we assume that the wealth effects in our model are negligible.
Without wealth effects,  then after the shock has ended the economy must have returned to 
steady-state
8.  The  particular  shock  we  consider  is  a  preference  shock, which temporarily 
raises demand for home goods relative to foreign. Given our forward-looking Phillips curves, 
equations (58) and (59), with excess demand (supply) at home (abroad) output price inflation 
must be falling (rising) at home (abroad). Since, inflation in both economies must return to 
equilibrium once the shock is over, these inflation paths determine the initial inflation jumps 
(positive at home, negative overseas) necessary to restore equilibrium once the shock has 
passed.
A key issue is what happens to the real exchange rate (competitiveness) during and 
after this shock. This is because, under PPP, real interest rates are equalised across our two 
economies, so the only way of deflating the home economy relative to the foreign is to induce 
a real exchange rate appreciation. By combining the definitions of home and foreign GDP, 
equations (70) and (71), we can relate the difference between home and foreign output to the
real exchange rate, 
* ˆ ˆ ˆ t t t y y e θ − = (39)
With no change in nominal interest rates, the nominal exchange rate would jump to a
new equilibrium level which is consistent with the steady state level of the real exchange rate 
i.e. a nominal depreciation from the home country’s point of view. However, to the extent that 
higher inflation at home results in higher nominal interest rates at home relative to abroad, 
then monetary policy will pull the exchange rate in the opposite direction. Critically, the sign 
of the net effect depends on whether output or consumer price inflation is targeted.
Consider targeting output price inflation first.  The dynamics of the exchange rate are 
given by,
8 If the wealth effects introduced through our infinitely lived consumers are significant, then changes in 
the distribution of financial wealth between the two consumers can prolong the effects of a given 
shock. Once the shock has passed, to the extent that one country has accumulated the financial wealth 
of the other, there will be inflationary pressure in that country while finitely lived consumers run-down
their holdings of net foreign assets. However, the uniqueness, or otherwise, of the saddlepath can still 
be considered by analysing the behaviour of inflation and the exchange rate when the initial jumps in 
these variables are different from an assumed dynamic path which reaches the steady-state.15
* ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) t op t op t de m h m f π π = − (40)
As  long  as  the  Taylor  principle  is  followed,  the  real exchange rate will be depreciating 
following the preference shock. and the effect on the exchange rate of higher home interest 
rates outweighs the effect of higher output prices. Therefore, the initial shock will generate a 
jump  appreciation  in  the  home  real  exchange  rate,  followed  by  a  depreciation  towards 
equilibrium as inflation unwinds. Suppose, however, that home (overseas) inflation is still 
above  (below)  equilibrium  once  the  shock  is  over.  Equation (40) tells us that if the real 
exchange  rate  is  to  return  to  equilibrium,  then  the  home  real  exchange  rate  must  be
appreciated  relative  to  its  steady-state value. This appreciation will be reducing (raising) 
demand for home (foreign) goods. However, with a forward-looking Phillips curve, these 
changes in demand will be raising  (reducing) home  (overseas) inflation
9. Thus by deviating 
from the assumed equilibrium path, the economy will fail to reach the steady-state. Therefore,
there is a unique saddlepath which will return the economy to equilibrium for a given shock, 
under rules specified in terms of output price inflation. 
Now  consider  consumer  price  inflation  targeting.    The  nominal  interest  rate
differential is given by
* * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) t t cp t cp t R R m m π π − = + − + (41)
Using  the  definition  of  consumer  price  inflation  and  the  UIP  condition  for  the  nominal 
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Differentiating  the  definition  of  the  real  exchange  rate  with  respect  to  time,  and  utilising
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Notice that the signs of the coefficients on home and foreign inflation in the equation of 
motion for the real exchange rate are now reversed in the case of CPI-based rules. 
The initial inflation shock will now generate a jump depreciation in the home real 
exchange rate, followed by a appreciation towards equilibrium while the shock lasts. Suppose, 
however,  we  deviate  from  the  equilibrium  path,  so  that    home  (foreign)  inflation  is  still 
positive (negative) once the shock has passed. Equation (43) implies that the real exchange 
rate must be appreciating. For this to remain consistent with attaining the steady-state the real 
9 Note the opposite is true when inflation is determined in a backward-looking manner, but this is 
exactly what is required when inflation is considered to be a predetermined variable. 16
exchange rate must be depreciated relative to equilibrium, raising (lowering) the demand for 
home (overseas) goods. In the context of forward-looking Phillips curves this implies that 
home (foreign) output price inflation is falling (rising), so that we can also reach the steady-
state following this alternative dynamic path
10. In other words, there are multiple paths to the 
steady-state,  which  leaves  the  price  level  undefined.    CPI-inflation based rules generate 
indeterminacy in the context of our benchmark two-country model.
In the case where one economy (in this case home) targets CPI inflation and the other 
economy (foreign) targets output price inflation the interest rate differential can be shown to 
be,
* *
* 1 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( )
1 1
cp op op cp
t t t t
cp cp
m m m m
R R h f
m m
π π




The numerators of these expressions capture the ‘direct’ impact of output price inflation in the 
two economies on the monetary policies of the two economies. It is clear that monetary policy 
in  the  home  country  responds  to  both  domestic  and  foreign  inflation,  while  the  foreign 
economy reacts only to output price inflation in that economy. As a result the impact of 
foreign inflation on the interest rate differential, depends not only on monetary policy in the 
foreign economy, but on the extent to which the home monetary authorities offset that policy. 
However, the interesting factor in this expression is the numerator,  1 cp m − , which captures 
the  repercussions  of  the  monetary  policy  response  to  home  and  foreign  inflation  on  the 
exchange rate which then feeds through into home CPI inflation. Accordingly, when the home 
country aggressively targets CPI inflation,  1 cp m > , exchange rate movements can dominate 
the setting of monetary policy, such that an inflationary shock in the home country actually 
leads to a reduction in the nominal interest rate differential. This then prevents the monetary 
authorities engineering the real exchange rate appreciation required to disinflate the home 
economy. We can also note that this reasoning goes through for the home economy even if 
overseas monetary policy and inflation are fixed.
11
The logic of these arguments requires only that an appreciated real exchange rate 
deflates the demand for goods. The intertemporal behaviour of consumers is not critical here. 
In fact, it is possible to demonstrate these stability results in a simpler (but less satisfactory) 
model in which consumption responds statically to real interest rates, labour supply is fixed 
and an appreciation in the real exchange rate reduces demand for domestic output. In addition, 
as noted above, the result also carries over into a world where prices are set by backward-
10 Again this logic is reversed when inflation is considered to be a predetermined variable, set 
according to a backward-looking rule of thumb.
11 See Linnemann and Schabert (2001) who generate a similar result for a small open economy.17
looking rules of thumb, and inflation is determined by a traditional accelerationist Phillips 
curve.
To obtain this clear-cut result we relied on two key features of the model: PPP and the 
lack of any ‘home bias’ in consumption patterns in the two economies. However, even if we 
relax these assumptions, the basic mechanism underlying the different outcomes under the 
two rules would still come through to some extent. As long as there is some pass-through
from  the  exchange  rate  to  consumer  prices,  then  relying  on a  rule specified in  terms  of 
consumer  prices  will  lessen  the  ability  of  one  economy  to  disinflate  relative  to  another 
following a given asymmetric inflationary shock. If the degree of openness of the economy is 
large enough and the pass-through from the exchange rate to consumer prices sufficiently 
fluid then we may continue to observe that Taylor rules specified in terms of consumer price 
inflation are destabilising. 
4.Conclusions
In this paper we considered the ability of Taylor rules to stabilise a standard ‘new 
open economy macroeconomics’ description of the open economy. We found that much of 
the analysis of closed economy Taylor rules applies to the open economy when the excess 
inflation term in the rule is specified in terms of output prices.  The only major difference, 
relative to the closed economy or small open economy cases, was that failure to fulfil the 
Taylor principle on the part of one monetary authority could be partially offset by a more 
active monetary policy on the part of the monetary authority in the second economy. 
However, if the Taylor rule was specified in terms of consumer price inflation (as is 
frequently  the  case),  these  conventional  results  no  longer  held.  Rules  which  satisfied  the 
Taylor  principle,  and  which  were  consistent with estimated policy reaction functions, but 
which targeted CPI inflation, would not deliver a unique rational expectations path for prices. 
Our results imply that adoption of Taylor rules based on consumer rather than output price 
inflation may be chronically destabilising. Therefore, to the extent that Taylor rules are a 
reasonable description of central bank behaviour, the fact that more central banks are adopting 
explicit inflation targets based on consumer prices should be a cause for concern.18
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Appendix I – Log-linearising the model around its steady-state.
The Steady-State
In this Appendix we linearise our model around a symmetrical steady-state. We also 
assume, for simplicity, that the rate of inflation in our steady-state is zero, so that the mis-
pricing due to overlapping contracts will not exist in steady-state. Equation (19) shows that 
the optimal price in steady-state, which is the same as that which would be set under flexible 









Combining  this  with  the  labour  supply  condition,  the  linear  production  function  and  the 
national accounting identity (in the symmetrical steady-state the current account will be in 










If government spending is set equal to zero, then this is identical to the steady-state output 
found in Obstfeld and Rogoff (op. cit.).
The steady-state consumption function is given by,
( )
( )
y D F M
c k
r k P P
τ ε
σ   − +
= + + +   +  
(47)
The domestic government’s budget constraint becomes, 
* g D F
P r
τ − + = (48)




Note that in this symmetrical equilibrium, with PPP due to free trade, it will also be the case 




= . This 
fact, combined with equations (46)-(49), will determine the steady-state value of real assets in 
the model, along with the equilibrium real interest rate, 
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Since consumers are not infinitely lived, the real interest rate is not identical to consumers’ 
rate of time preference, but will be affected by the outstanding stock of government liabilities, 
since these liabilities constitute consumers’ net wealth.
Log-Linearising the Model:
We now proceed to log-linearise the model around this symmetrical steady-state. To 








N k k i t di
P c κ −∞
= − ∫ (51)
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides, differentiating and evaluating this expression at 
the symmetrical steady-state yields, 
ˆ
t t t N w c = − ⌢ ⌢ (52)






This approach can be applied to all the equations in our model. 
Next, consider the linearised expression for the optimal price set by a home firm,
( )[ ]exp( ( )( ) t s s
t
p r P w r s t ds α α
∞
= + + − + − ∫
⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ɶ (53)
Differentiating  this  expression  with  respect  to  time  and  substituting  for  the  definition  of 
consumer prices,  1 1 1 ˆ ( ) ( )
2 2 2
t t t t P p h p f ε = + +
⌢ ⌢ ⌢ , yields,
1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )( ( ) ( ) )
2 2 2
t t t t t t dp r p p h p f w α ε = + − − − −
⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ɶ ɶ (54)
Log-linearising the expression for the index of home country output prices gives,
ˆ ˆ( ) exp( ( )) ]
t
t s p h p t s ds α α
−∞
= − − ∫ ɶ (55)
Differentiating with respect to time,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ( ) ) t t t dp h p p h α = − ɶ (56)
Differentiating again,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ( ) )
1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ) )
2 2 2
t t t
t t t t t
d h dp dp h
r h r w r p h p f
π α
α π α α α α ε
= −
= − + + + − −
ɶ
(57)
Substituting  the  linearised  labour  supply  function  and  the  definition  of  the  real
exchange  rate  into  this  expression  gives  the  open  economy  Phillips curve for the home 
economy,22
( ) 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
t t t t t
r
d h r h r c y e
α α
π π α α
θ
+
= − + + − (58)
and a similar expression for the foreign economy,
* * ( ) 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
t t t t t
r
d f r h r c y e
α α
π π α α
θ
+
= − + + + (59)
In our open economy the evolution of private sector financial assets in the home 
country is given by,
(1 ) t t t t t t da ra c y χ τ = − + + − (60)
Log-linearising yields the private sectors’ budget constraint, 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t t t t t t
ry rc r
da ra rr c y
g c g c g c
τ
χ τ
τ χ τ χ τ χ
= + − + + −
− + − + − +
(61)
along with the corresponding equation for the foreign economy,
* * * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) t t t t t t
ry rc r
da ra rr c y
g c g c g c
τ
χ τ
τ χ τ χ τ χ
= + − + + −
− + − + − +
(62)
where  the  tax  rules  are  designed  to  fix  the  real  value  of  government  liabilities,

















Any increase in the level of the financial wealth of the private sector relative to the liabilities 
of the government implies an increase in holdings of foreign government debt. 
Now we turn to the consumption function,






c k y r k d ds
P
σ τ µ µ
∞
= + + − − + ∫ ∫ (65)
Differentiating with respect to time,
( )( ) t t t dc k da dh σ = + + (66)




h y r k d ds τ µ µ
∞
= − − + ∫ ∫ ,  and
( ) t t t t t dh r k h y τ = + − + . Using the equations of motion for human and non-human wealth 
allows us to rewrite the equation of motion for consumption as,
( ( )(1 )) ( ) t t t t dc r k k c k k a σ χ σ = + − + + − + (67)
Log-linearising this expression describes the evolution of consumption for the home country,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( )(1 )) ( ) t t t t
g y dc r k k c rr k k a
ry
τ χ
σ χ σ − + = + − + + + − + (68)
and in the foreign country,23
* * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ( )(1 )) ( ) t t t t
g y





= + − + + + − + (69)
This is the usual consumption Euler equation, adjusted for holdings of money balances and 
allowing for the possibility that finite lives mean that government debt constitutes an element 
in net wealth. 
Since output  and consumption and  not synonymous  in our open  economy  model, 
there are equations defining aggregate output in the home economy,
* 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 )( )
2
t t t t t
g
y p h P c c
y
θ θ =− + + − + (70)
and average foreign firm output,
* * 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) (1 )( )
2
t t t t t
g
y p f P c c
y
θ θ =− + + − + (71)
Finally, there are global market clearing conditions for the goods market, 
* * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 )( ) ( ) t t t t t t
g g
y y c c g g
y y
+ = − + + + (72)
and for the bonds market, 
* ˆ ˆ t t a a =− (73)24
 Appendix II – The model in Matrix Form with Rules Targeting Output Price Inflation
To undertake this stability analysis detailed in the text, it is helpful to represent our economies 
as a dynamic system in matrix algebra form. This can be achieved quite easily as follows. 
First of all, note that the global market clearing conditions allow us to eliminate one of our 
financial asset variables from the system since it is determined as a residual of the other three. 
We choose to drop 
* ˆt a , although the choice is immaterial. Similarly we can eliminate 
* ˆt y  from 
all equations using the condition for market clearing in the goods market. Finally, noting that 
the definition of consumer prices implies that 1 1 1 ˆ ( ) ( )
2 2 2
t t t t P p h p f ε = + +
⌢ ⌢ ⌢  it can be seen that 
home firm output (22) depends upon aggregate demand and the real exchange rate, which can 
be defined as,  ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) t t t t e p h p f ε = − + + . Therefore, any terms in domestic output can be 
replaced  with  a  combination  of  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  components  of  aggregate
demand,
* ˆ ˆ ˆ , , t t t c c g  and 
* ˆt g , such that, 
* 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 )( )
2 2
t t t t
g
y e c c
y
θ
= + − + .
With  rules  defined  in  terms  of  output  price  inflation,  PPP  implies  that  the  UIP
condition in nominal terms can be written as
* *
* * *
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
t t t t t
op t op t y t y t
d rr rr
m h m f m y m y
ε π π
π π
= + − +
= + − + + −
(74)
The evolution of the real exchange rate is given by,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) t t t t de h f d π π ε = − + + (75)
which can then be rewritten to give,
* * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
t op t op t y y t y y t t
c
de m f m h m m e m m c c
y
θ
π π =− + + + + − + (76)
Additionally the real interest rate implied by these rules can be shown to be, 
* * * * 1 1 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2 2
t op t op t y y t y y t t
c
rr m h m f m m e m m c c
y
θ
π π = − + − + + + (77)
This then allows us to write the complete dynamic system in matrix algebra form as,25
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= + and x g c τ χ = − + .26
Appendix III – The signs of the coefficients of the determinant
( )
2 2 ( )
[1] 2 (1 )(1 ) ( )(1 )
i
r r g g g
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 
                     
(78)
In order to determine the sign of A[1] we need to know the sign of the bracketed expression, 
(i). Substituting for the definition of z, and the value of the equilibrium real interest rate  (50)
allows us to rewrite this as, 
2
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(79)
Which implies that A[1]>0.
Coefficient A[3] is given by, 
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(80)
The bracketed expression labelled (ii) can be shown to be, 
2
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(81)
by substituting for z and the equilibrium real interest rate. Here the sign of this coefficient is 
positive.
Coefficient A[3] is given by, 
( )
2 ( )( )
[3] (1 )(1 ) ( )(1 ) 0
i
r r r g g
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(82)
Where the sign of this coefficient is determined by the same bracketed expression as in  (79)
allowing us to conclude that this coefficient is also positive.
Finally, coefficient A[4] is given by, 27
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and the bracketed expression, (iii) can again be shown to be positive,
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Appendix IV – The Model in Matrix Form with Rules Targeting CPI Inflation. 
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which, using the definition of the UIP condition in real terms along with the global product 
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As a result the dynamic system can be represented as, 29
* * * *
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= +  and x g c τ χ = − + .30
Appendix V – The Model in Matrix Form with Mixed Rules. 
With excess inflation  defined  in  terms  of  CPI  inflation  in  the  home  economy  and 
output price inflation in the foreign economy, the UIP condition can be rewritten as,
* *
* 1 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) 2
1 1 1 1
cp op cp y y
t t t t t
cp cp cp cp
m m m m m
d h f y y
m m m m
ε π π
+ + −
= − + −
− − − −
(88)
which, using the definition of the UIP condition in real terms along with the global product 
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As a result the dynamic system can be represented as, 31




0 (1 ) (1 ) 0
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= +  and x g c τ χ = − + .32